

EXHIBIT

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109th Congress
2d Session

SENATE

**REPORT
OF THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
ON
POSTWAR FINDINGS ABOUT IRAQ'S WMD PROGRAMS AND
LINKS TO TERRORISM AND HOW THEY COMPARE WITH
PREWAR ASSESSMENTS**

together with

ADDITIONAL VIEWS

September 8, 2006 - Ordered to be printed

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ADDITIONAL VIEWS

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SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE United States Senate

109th Congress

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[REDACTED]

credible reporting that al-Qa'ida leaders sought help from Baghdad in acquiring WMD capabilities and that Iraq provided training in bomb-making and, according to one detainee, in the area of chemical and biological agents.”²⁰⁶

2. SSCI July 2004 Report Conclusions - CBW Training

(U) In July 2004, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence concluded that the CIA reasonably and objectively assessed that the most problematic area of contact between Iraq and al-Qa'ida were the reports of training in the use of non-conventional weapons, specifically chemical and biological weapons. The Committee noted that after the war, a key detainee (al-Libi) had recanted his claim that al-Qa'ida members traveled to Iraq for chemical and biological weapons training. The Committee noted that no other reporting found in Iraq after the war began had corroborated the CBW training reports.²⁰⁷

3. Postwar Information - CBW Training

([REDACTED]) In January 2004, Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi, the source of reports on al-Qa'ida's efforts to obtain CBW training in Iraq, recanted the information he provided. Al-Libi said he had a “strong desire to tell his entire story and identify why and how he fabricated information since his capture.”²⁰⁸ Al-Libi claimed that he fabricated “all information regarding al-Qa'ida’s sending representatives to Iraq to try to obtain WMD assistance.”²⁰⁹ Al-Libi claimed that to the best of his knowledge al-Qa'ida never sent any individuals into Iraq for any kind of support in

²⁰⁶ NIE, *Non-Traditional Threats to the U.S. Homeland Through 2007*, Nov 2002, p. 17. Note: The NIE did not include a cite for this information, but the only detainee known have discussed this issue was al-Libi.

²⁰⁷ *Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq*, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, S. Rept. 108-301, July 7, 2004. p. 339.

²⁰⁸ CIA operational cable, February 4, 2004.

²⁰⁹ CIA operational cable, February 4, 2004.

[REDACTED]
chemical or biological weapons, as he had claimed previously. [REDACTED]

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([REDACTED]) Al-Libi told CIA debriefers in January 2004 that when he was detained by the United States in early 2002 one of his American debriefers told him that he had to tell “where bin Laden was and about future operations or the U.S. would give al-Libi to [another foreign service.]” [REDACTED] Al-Libi claimed that the debriefers told al-Libi that he would have to sleep on the floor of his cell if he did not talk. Later, according to al-Libi, debriefers repeated the threat to send al-Libi to a foreign country [REDACTED], instructed him to remove his heavy socks and gloves, and placed him on the floor of his cell. Although al-Libi only remained on the cold floor for fifteen minutes, he claimed he “decided he would fabricate any information the interrogators wanted in order to gain better treatment and avoid being handed over to [a foreign government.]” [REDACTED]

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(U) According to al-Libi, after his decision to fabricate information for debriefers, he “lied about being a member of al-Qa’ida. Although he considered himself close to, but not a member of, al-Qa’ida, he knew enough about the senior members, organization and operations to claim to be a member.”²¹² “Once al-Libi started fabricating information,” he claimed, “his treatment improved and he experienced no further physical pressures from the Americans.”²¹³

([REDACTED]) After his transfer to a foreign government [REDACTED], al-Libi claimed that during his initial debriefings “he lied to the [foreign government service] [REDACTED] about future operations to avoid torture.”²¹⁴ Al-Libi told the CIA that

²¹⁰ CIA operational cable, February 19, 2004.

²¹¹ CIA operational cable, February 5, 2004.

²¹² CIA operational cable, February 5, 2004.

²¹³ CIA operational cable, February 5, 2004.

²¹⁴ CIA operational cable, February 5, 2004.

[REDACTED]

the foreign government service [REDACTED] explained to him that a “long list of methods could be used against him which were extreme” and that “he would confess because three thousand individuals had been in the chair before him and that each had confessed.”²¹⁵

(U) According to al-Libi, the foreign government service [REDACTED] “stated that the next topic was al-Qa’ida’s connections with Iraq. . . . This was a subject about which he said he knew nothing and had difficulty even coming up with a story.” Al-Libi indicated that his interrogators did not like his responses and then “placed him in a small box approximately 50cm x 50cm.” He claimed he was held in the box for approximately 17 hours. When he was let out of the box, al-Libi claims that he was given a last opportunity to “tell the truth.” When al-Libi did not satisfy the interrogator, al-Libi claimed that “he was knocked over with an arm thrust across his chest and he fell on his back.” Al-Libi told CIA debriefers that he then “was punched for 15 minutes.”²¹⁶

(U) Al-Libi told debriefers that “after the beating,” he was again asked about the connection with Iraq and this time he came up with a story that three al-Qa’ida members went to Iraq to learn about nuclear weapons. Al-Libi said that he used the names of real individuals associated with al-Qa’ida so that he could remember the details of his fabricated story and make it more believable to the foreign intelligence service. Al-Libi noted that “this pleased his [foreign] interrogators, who directed that al-Libi be taken back to a big room, vice the 50 square centimeter box and given food.”²¹⁷

(U) According to al-Libi, several days after the Iraq nuclear discussion, the foreign intelligence service debriefers [REDACTED] brought up the topic of anthrax and biological weapons. Al-Libi stated that he “knew nothing about a biological program and did not even understand the term biological.” Al-

²¹⁵ CIA operational cable, February 5, 2004.

²¹⁶ CIA operational cable, February 5, 2004.

²¹⁷ CIA operational cable, February 5, 2004.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Libi stated that "he could not come up with a story and was then beaten in a way that left no marks." According to al-Libi, he continued "to be unable to come up with a lie about biological weapons" because he did not understand the term "biological weapons."²¹⁸

(U) In February 2004, the CIA reissued the intelligence reporting from al-Libi to reflect the recantations.

(U) The other reports of possible al-Qa'ida CBW training from Iraq were never considered credible by the Intelligence Community. No other information has been uncovered in Iraq or from detainees that confirms this reporting.

4. Terrorist Training at Salman Pak

(U) The Salman Pak Unconventional Warfare Training Facility was established in the late 1970's. Iraqi officials told UNSCOM inspectors that a counterterrorist unit was established at Salman Pak in 1985. Iraqi officials reiterated the claims and indicated that the IIS established the facility to train counterterror units.

(U) The January 2003 *Iraqi Support for Terrorism* noted that uncorroborated reporting since 1999 indicated that Iraq sponsored terrorism training for al-Qa'ida at the Salman Pak facility. *Iraqi Support for Terrorism* also said that:

Reporting about al-Qa'ida activity at Salman Pak—ultimately sourced to three Iraqi defectors—surged after 11 September. The defectors claimed that al-Qa'ida and other non-Iraqis engaged in special operations training at Salman Pak. It was subsequently determined, however, that at least one of these defectors, whose story appeared in [REDACTED] magazine, had embellished and exaggerated his access.

²¹⁸ CIA operational cable, February 5, 2004.

[REDACTED]

EXHIBIT

X



THE WHITE HOUSE
PRESIDENT
GEORGE W. BUSH

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For Immediate Release
Office of the Press Secretary
August 14, 2003

Press Gaggle by Scott McClellan and a Senior Administration Official
Aboard Air Force One
En route MCAS Miramar, California

- Introduction of Senior Administration Official
- Background of Ryuduan bin Isomuddin (Hambali)
- Hambali facilitated meeting in Malaysia
- Al Qaeda provided money to Hambali
- Information will help with ongoing threats
- Hambali capture is a significant victory
- President visits Marine Corps Air Station in Miramar
- President's schedule and announcements
- UN Involvement in Iraq
- Support of ECOMIL mission in Liberia
- President will talk about National Parks Legacy Project

12:48 P.M. CDT

MR. McCLELLAN: All right, good afternoon, everybody. I want to start with an important news development. And what I want to do is I'm going to have some brief remarks on this, and then I'm going to have a senior administration official give you a little bit more information. And then we can do the rest of the gaggle, and I will authorize you all to go ahead and call this in to your desks, this news.

Earlier this week, Ryuduan bin Isomuddin, known as Hambali, was captured. He is now in custody of the United States government. Hambali was al Qaeda's chief representative and senior planner in Southeast Asia. He was operational chief of Jemaah Islamiya, the violent Islamic extremist group based in Indonesia. Hambali's capture is another important victory in the global war on terrorism and a significant blow to the enemy. The United States will be relentless in its pursuit of terrorists, in order to rid the world of the scourge of terrorism.

And now I want to bring in a senior administration official to give you a little bit more information.

Q Can you spell the name?

MR. McCLELLAN: This will be in the transcript: Ryuduan, R-y-u-d-u-a-n, then bin, b-i-n, and then Isomuddin, I-s-o-m-u-d-d-i-n. And Hambali, H-a-m-b-a-l-i. That's what he – he is known as Hambali.

Now let me switch to the senior administration official. He'll give you a little bit more information.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: **Hambali is one of the world's most lethal terrorists.** He's a 39-year old. The 39-year old Hambali was al Qaeda's chief representative in Southeast Asia and operational chief of Jemaah Islamiya. His lengthy terrorist credentials include the Bali nightclub bombings in October, 2002, that killed nearly 200 people.

Q He was the main guy for that? Is that what you're saying?

Q Mastermind?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. Hold on a second. And a deadly series of church bombings in Indonesia and the Philippines in December 2000. He's a leading suspect in the bombing of the J.W. Marriott Hotel in Jakarta earlier this month. He's also -- Hambali is a close associate of the September 11th mastermind, Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, KSM.

Q You said -- I'm sorry, I missed that. What's the connection there?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He's a close associate.

Q And spell that other person's name, please?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: KSM, Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, K-h-a-l-i-d, S-h-a-y-k, M-u-h-a-m-m-e-d. Again, he's who we previously captured.

Q Would you mind spelling the name of that syndicate? What's the name of that al Jemaah? Can you spell that, too?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Jemaah Islamiya. J-e-m-a-a-h, I-s-l-a-m-i-y-a.

Q And he is a chief in that organization?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: **He's the operational chief of Jemaah Islamiya.** Hang on a second, I'm going to give you a little bit more information. As I was saying, he is the leading suspect in the bombing of the J.W. Marriott Hotel in Jakarta and close associate of Khalid Shaykh Muhammad. Hambali facilitated the January 2000 meeting in Malaysia that included two of the September 11th hijackers.

Q KSM did?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Information obtained from a senior al Qaeda detainee and corroborated by other sources indicates al Qaeda tasked Hambali shortly after September 11th with recruiting pilots to participate in additional hijackings inside the United States.

Q Can you repeat it, from the Malaysia meeting?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes: facilitated the January 2000 meeting in Malaysia that included two of the September 11th hijackers.

Q And who was this? Is this the guy you talked --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: **We'll see what additional information I can get you.** Let me continue. As I was talking about, on these additional attacks that Hambali was involved and participating in, the sources also indicate that an al Qaeda leader in Pakistan earlier this year provided Hambali a large sum of money for a major attack. Information obtained from Hambali will assist in our ongoing efforts to neutralize the threat.

Again, as was previously stated, this is a significant victory in the global war on terrorism and a devastating blow to the enemy. He was one of the few remaining senior planners of al Qaeda and their most important link to terrorist groups in Southeast Asia.

Q Their most important link, I-i-n-k?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. His detention effectively diminishes the group's lethal capabilities and global reach. It's still important to remember that this fight has captured -- that al Qaeda remains a threat to the United States, our allies and interests around the world.

Q Can you go over that key sentence: it effectively diminishes the group's --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Their lethal capabilities and global reach.

Q That's al Jemaah or al Qaeda?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's -- the importance of which is magnified in the series of high profile arrests of al Qaeda operatives around the world in recent months. It effectively diminishes the group's lethal capabilities and --

Q Which group?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What I'm trying to tell you is that -- al Qaeda. This is a significant victory.

Q al Qaeda.

Q Can you go over again -- after September 11th, Hambali was recruited to find pilots for further attacks? Is that what you were saying?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's right, to participate in additional hijackings inside the United States.

Q That's something that we have known before. I know we've known about the meeting in Malaysia.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's why I wanted to put this in perspective, the importance of this, the importance of the capture of Hambali.

Q Is there new indication that there were plans --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think you can double-check some of this with the Central Intelligence Agency.

Q And the Pakistani money for further attacks was in 2003, what you just said about that --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It was earlier this year, that's correct.

Q Was that major attack thwarted, or was that J.W. Marriott?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's what I said, information attained from Hambali will assist in efforts to neutralize the threat.

Q When you said, sources indicate al Qaeda leader of Pakistan provided him a large sum of money for a major attack.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's right.

Q Was that attack --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: **Information obtained from Hambali is going to assist us in our ongoing efforts to neutralize that threat. We have ongoing efforts to neutralize the threat, among many others.**

Q -- is going to assist us or has assisted us?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I said, information obtained from him will assist us in our ongoing efforts to neutralize this threat.

Q Can you tell us anything about where he was captured, or any of the details of the operation? A U.S. military

operation, other helpful countries?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It was a joint operation, but I cannot get into the details of that operation at this point. It did involve others.

Q In Indonesia?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q Other governments?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I cannot get into those details, those specifics at this point.

Q When did he actually --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Earlier this week.

Q Are you -- is this the first news that any --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Remember, this is going to be very helpful in helping us obtain information about current and future threats, this capture.

Q Are you telling us this, the first news of this coming out from anywhere? Like, DOD isn't briefing on this or anything like that? Is this --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I am announcing it. I am announcing it.

Q Where was the capture?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Again, I can't get into the specific details of that.

Q Was it in the U.S.?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Southeast Asia.

Q Can you tell us in what part of the world he is being held right now?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I can't get into those kind of details at this point.

Q Is he being held by the U.S. government?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's what was said, he's in the custody of the United States government.

Q Why did you choose to make this announcement instead of CIA or --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: This is a significant announcement. This is a significant victory in our global war on terrorism. And as you have heard from -- as you have heard what an evil person he is, that's what I wanted to describe for you, the importance of the capture of Hambali.

Q Will the President be making reference to this today?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, listen to his remarks. I expect he may.

Q Do you know when he was told about this?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yesterday.

Q Do you know by whom? Condi Rice?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In his briefings, his intelligence briefings.

Q He was told yesterday?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q Do you know anything about his reaction?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, again, you might want to listen to his remarks.

Q I want to make sure I'm a thousand percent clear on something. He says, an al Qaeda leader in Pakistan provided him a large sum of money for a major attack. Is that something that we thwarted or one that may still be brewing, or what?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's what I said. We have ongoing efforts to neutralize such a threat. And we are -- the information that we will obtain from Hambali will help us in those efforts.

Q So it wasn't the J.W. Marriott or something that's already happened?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: **At this point, he is going to be interrogated.** We will be able to learn more information about current and future threats. But we take all threats seriously and we confront those threats. We address those threats. Intelligence is something that we take very seriously. And that's why this is such an important victory.

Now, do we want to go back to Scott for -- are we through with this?

Q Hambali, himself, provided the information about the Pakistani-al Qaeda funding, or that information came from somewhere else?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I said -- I believe you're talking about -- which part are you talking about?

Q The Pakistan money. Who was the source of that information?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Sources, sources that we have. We had senior -- we had information -- that's what I pointed out -- information from a senior al Qaeda detainee, and corroborated by other sources, about the initial efforts where Hambali was tasked with recruiting pilots to participate in additional hijackings. And then I said, those sources -- referring to the same sources -- also indicate that a large sum of money --

Q The beginning of that sentence was, information --

Q And he --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He will be interrogated about current and future threats in our custody, and that's why I said, in that context, we will be able to obtain additional information from him to help us in our ongoing efforts to neutralize this threat.

Q One last time. You have from sources, detainees, that al Qaeda provided Hambali with a large sum of money for a major attack?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Right.

Q Where? Here, in the United States? What do you know about the attack?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's -- the information that I'm sharing with you at this time is what I have here. We have ongoing efforts to -- we will seek more information from Hambali on that.

Q What's the language on the other part -- the first part of the sentence, information obtained --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I've been through this. I've been through this. We're going to have a transcript on this.

Q I just want to make sure I get it right. Was information obtained by --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We're going to have a transcript on this.

Q I just want to make sure --

MR. McCLELLAN: No, I think --

Q -- got it right: information obtained by U.S. government says --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Will help us in our ongoing efforts to neutralize the threat.

Q Not what I'm asking, sorry. The part about him recruiting 9/11 hijackers. How do you know that?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: From a senior al Qaeda detainee and other sources that corroborated that account.

Q He wasn't recruiting 9/11 hijackers, he was recruiting future hijackers post-9/11?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's correct.

Q All right.

Q I thought this was the January 2000 meeting.

Q No, no, no, that was the Malaysia meeting.

Q Malaysia meeting.

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, different meeting. That was two of the September 11th hijackers.

Q Can you be precise about --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We'll have a transcript for this.

Q What was precise alleged role in the Bali nightclub? Bali mastermind, facilitator?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He's their -- as I said Jemaah Islamiya's is chief operational planner in southeast Asia.

Q Would it be an over-statement to call him the mastermind of that attack?

Q He's responsible --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He's the operational chief, I would describe him as the operational chief of -- is Jemaah Islamiya. They have been linked to the Bali bombings.

Q Linked?

Q He has been linked, or Jemaah --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Jemaah Islamiya -- look, Central Intelligence Agency can probably provide you additional information that -- but this is already, this is information that is already out.

Q And as a senior administration official, does the White House -- are you doing this here because the White House is eager to take partial credit or a large share of the credit for this?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We're announcing this because of the significance of this capture. We're announcing this because there's a significant development in our ongoing war on terrorism. And to provide you with information about this individual and the fact that he is someone who has a long history of wanting to harm America and our allies and others around the world.

Q I just can't recall another occasion where the White House announced a capture like this. I'm sure it's happened, but I can't recall.

Q Why did you announce it today, and not yesterday, when the President was informed? Was this in order to link up with the remarks at Miramar or not to step on --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We're announcing it as soon as we are able to make this information public. A lot of times there are -- well, for a number of reasons, sometimes these announcements are not made exactly when they happen, and that involves national security issues, other reasons about why. But we were able to go ahead and make this announcement public and wanted to share the information with you.

Q Does this person, Hambali, go into a judicial process now? What happens there?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He's being detained and interrogated at this point.

Q Indefinitely?

Q Can you say, his detention, which agency is interrogating him?

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He's in the custody of the United States government.

Q Can I ask one --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: All right, we're going to go back -- other matters?

Q Back to Scott.

MR. McCLELLAN: All right, thank you everybody. The President had his usual briefings this morning. Now we are on our way to the Marine Corps Air Station in Miramar, where the President will thank our men and women in the Armed Services, and their families for all that they are doing, and provide an update on the war on terrorism.

Let me give you a little bit of information about the Marine Corps Air Station in Miramar. First of all, there are going to be about 12,000 military personnel and families there, and they include personnel and families from the Marine Corps Air Station in Miramar, Camp Pendleton, and the Naval Base Coronado.

Following the remarks, the President will have lunch with military personnel.

Miramar Marine Corps Air Station is a 24,000 acre installation, located in the northern suburbs of San Diego. It is one of the largest military bases in the area. Miramar maintains a military personnel force of more than 10,000 and an additional 2,000 civilians. It's home to approximately 225 aircraft, and is the headquarters for the 3rd Marine Air Wing and the Commander of the Marine Corps Air Base's western area.

Following his remarks there --

Q Can you --

MR. McCLELLAN: The President, again, will have lunch with military personnel. Then this afternoon, also at Miramar, he'll have an interview with the Armed Forces Radio and Television. And once all that has been aired by the Armed Forces Radio and Television, we'll make the transcript available -- that probably won't be until this weekend, from what I understand.

Q When is the transcript going to be available?

MR. McCLELLAN: After it's aired on Armed Forces Television.

Q This weekend?

Q Can you just make a transcript available?

MR. McCLELLAN: As we always do.

Q -- on a day like today, that might be --

MR. McCLELLAN: No, you will not have it before it airs on Armed Forces Radio and Television, it'll be after it airs. That's the way we always do it, because they're the ones he's doing the interview with -- just like if it would be with you.

Q Is that broadcast around the world by that network, the Armed Forces Network?

MR. McCLELLAN: I think it's wherever they broadcast, yes, I believe so. I'll double-check that.

Then he makes remarks at the Bush-Cheney 2004 dinner in San Diego this evening, before we depart for Newport Beach, where he overnights.

Q Does this Marine base have a special connection to the Iraq war?

MR. McCLELLAN: There a number -- and I think the President will talk about it in his remarks -- there are a number of military personnel at this base that have recently returned from Iraq. And, you know, I think there are more than 70,000 men and women from bases in southern California that were deployed in Iraq. So you've got these other bases that will have military personnel and families there, as well.

Q Is he going to say anything new today, in terms of this update? I mean, I was led to believe earlier -- like, a week or two ago -- that he was going to make some sort of significant military speech. Is that not the case today?

MR. McCLELLAN: He will provide an update on the war on terrorism and talk about the important work that we are doing both in Afghanistan and Iraq and elsewhere in the world to win the war on terrorism.

Q So it's a new speech?

MR. McCLELLAN: I'm sorry?

Q Is it a new speech?

MR. McCLELLAN: It's an update. It's an update on the war on terrorism. So listen to his remarks, he'll provide an update.

Q Is he going to track closely with the 100-day report we got last week?

MR. McCLELLAN: Let him make his remarks and you'll hear from him directly. But, certainly, yes, he'll talk about the progress being made, talking about the difficulties that remain. It'll be that type of --

Q Is he going to go beyond what he said with Rumsfeld and the military advisors last week? Is it going to be any different than that?

MR. McCLELLAN: Wait for his remarks. You'll hear them all shortly --

Q Is he going to --

MR. McCLELLAN: -- as soon as we land --

Q All right. Is he going to mention Arnold's name?

MR. McCLELLAN: I think that he made -- we've made very clear our position on the California recall election. I think you have what our view is on that.

Q Will he even joke about it, do you think?

MR. McCLELLAN: Well, listen to his remarks.

Q The campaign says there will not be a single candidate at either fundraiser, today, tomorrow. Is that your understanding?

MR. McCLELLAN: Well, double-check with the campaign. I'm not aware of any.

Q Scott, there was a report in the paper this morning that the administration has decided to sort of not seek further U.N. endorsement in order to gain the support of more --

MR. McCLELLAN: **Yes, I know. I saw the article.** Our policy remains the same. First of all, the U.N. is involved in Iraq. They have a special representative, Sergio de Mello, who is working closely with Ambassador Bremer. I think we have also pointed out that under Resolution 1483, countries are participating in the stabilization and reconstruction of Iraq. That resolution provides authority for countries to participate and help. Again, this is a coalition-led effort. The U.N. is involved in Iraq. And there are a number of countries participating in Iraq under Resolution 1483.

Q But is it a challenge for the President to explain to these military personnel and their families that they're going to have these long deployments, a year at least, without, perhaps, what some people would say, if you got more U.N. support, you would get more foreign troops and could alleviate some of the stress and --

MR. McCLELLAN: I wanted to finish on one point. We are continuing to talk with other countries that want to participate in Iraq and help, and we will continue to do so. But in terms of Iraq, the President will continue to express our gratitude to our men and women in uniform and their families for the sacrifices they are making. This is an important cause, it's a just cause, that's part of our global war on terrorism and bringing democracy and security and freedom to Iraq will help bring peace and stability to the Middle East. And that will be significant in our overall efforts in the global war on terrorism. The President will continue to express our appreciation for all our troops are doing, and for their families.

What else?

Q I've got a quick Liberia question, and I wonder if you can preview tomorrow, as well. Rebels handed over parts of Monrovia, Liberia today. They were holding some of these important places, including a vital port. Is the President watching these developments day by day? Is that --

MR. McCLELLAN: Oh, absolutely.

Q -- that changed?

MR. McCLELLAN: Now, I do understand that the rebels are -- have been pulling back. We are, as the President said, doing what we can to support the ECOWAS mission in Liberia, ECOMIL, in their efforts to provide humanitarian assistance to the people of Liberia. And we will continue to work closely with ECOMIL about how we can help facilitate their efforts. But again, ECOMIL is in the lead, and we are there to provide support.

Q This would seem to be encouraging development today. Do you know enough about it to say what --

MR. McCLELLAN: Well, I think you ought to stay in touch with the Pentagon on the latest developments. But I do understand that the rebel forces are pulling back. The President noted yesterday that it's important to secure and open the port so that humanitarian assistance can be provided to those who have been suffering in Liberia, to the people of Liberia. That's what we're working to do.

Q One more question for you or the Senior Administration Official. Do you know if in the intelligence briefing the President got yesterday, was it on-site briefers, or was he -- I know he usually talks to Tenet and --

MR. McCLELLAN: Video-conferencing.

Q It was video-conferencing?

MR. McCLELLAN: Yes.

Q Can you talk about tomorrow's tour at all --

MR. McCLELLAN: Well, let me get you -- I'll get you more on that later. But, again, that's to -- well, the short version, the President will talk about National Parks Legacy Project and our initiatives to reduce the backlog and improve maintenance of our national parks, which are --

Q Backlog --

MR. McCLELLAN: I'm sorry?

Q The backlog?

MR. McCLELLAN: Yes, there's been a backlog on maintenance and repair projects at national parks, it goes back years. And we've taken significant steps to reduce that backlog and improve maintenance and make our parks where they are -- make our parks where they are enjoyable for all Americans.

Q Part of the \$5 billion pledge over certain --

MR. McCLELLAN: That's \$4.9 billion, yes, we've made significant steps in that direction, are continuing to work with Congress to provide additional funding in those efforts.

Q Do you recall how many years that was? Four point nine billion over --

MR. McCLELLAN: I'll double check it. All right. Thanks everybody.

END 1:15 P.M. CDT

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EXHIBIT

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Bush Aware of Advisers' Interrogation Talks

President Says He Knew His Senior Advisers Discussed Tough Interrogation Methods

By JAN CRAWFORD GREENBURG, HOWARD L. ROSENBERG and ARIANE de VOGUE

April 11, 2008—

President Bush says he knew his top national security advisers discussed and approved specific details about how high-value al Qaeda suspects would be interrogated by the Central Intelligence Agency, according to an exclusive interview with ABC News Friday.

"Well, we started to connect the dots in order to protect the American people." Bush told ABC News White House correspondent Martha Raddatz. "And yes, I'm aware our national security team met on this issue. And I approved."

As first reported by ABC News Wednesday, the most senior Bush administration officials repeatedly discussed and approved specific details of exactly how high-value al Qaeda suspects would be interrogated by the CIA.

The high-level discussions about these "enhanced interrogation techniques" were so detailed, these sources said, some of the interrogation sessions were almost choreographed -- down to the number of times CIA agents could use a specific tactic.

These top advisers signed off on how the CIA would interrogate top al Qaeda suspects -- whether they would be slapped, pushed, deprived of sleep or subjected to simulated drowning, called waterboarding, sources told ABC news.

The advisers were members of the National Security Council's Principals Committee, a select group of senior officials who met frequently to advise President Bush on issues of national security policy.

At the time, the Principals Committee included Vice President Dick Cheney, former National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Colin Powell, as well as CIA Director George Tenet and Attorney General John Ashcroft.

As the national security adviser, Rice chaired the meetings, which took place in the White House Situation Room and were typically attended by most of the principals or their deputies.

The so-called Principals who participated in the meetings also approved the use of "combined" interrogation techniques -- using different techniques during interrogations instead of using one method at a time -- on terrorist suspects who proved difficult to break, sources said.

Contacted by ABC News, spokesmen for Tenet and Rumsfeld declined to comment about the interrogation program or their private discussions in Principals meetings. The White House also declined comment on behalf of Rice and Cheney. Ashcroft could not be reached.

ABC News' Diane Sawyer sat down with Powell this week for a previously scheduled interview and asked him about the ABC News report.

Powell said that he didn't have "sufficient memory recall" about the meetings and that he had participated in "many meetings on how to deal with detainees."

Powell said, "I'm not aware of anything that we discussed in any of those meetings that was not considered legal."

In his interview with ABC News, Bush said the ABC report about the Principals' involvement was not so "startling." The president had earlier confirmed the existence of the interrogation program run by the CIA in a speech in 2006. But before Wednesday's report, the extraordinary level of involvement by the most senior advisers in repeatedly approving specific interrogation plans -- down to the number of times the CIA could use a certain tactic on a specific al Qaeda prisoner -- had never been disclosed.

Critics at home and abroad have harshly criticized the interrogation program, which pushed the limits of international law and, they say, condoned torture. Bush and his top aides have consistently defended the program. They say it is legal and did not constitute torture.

In interview with ABC's Charles Gibson last year, Tenet said: "It was authorized. It was legal, according to the Attorney General of the United States."

The discussions and meetings occurred in an atmosphere of great concern that another terror attack on the nation was imminent. Sources said the extraordinary involvement of the senior advisers in the grim details of exactly how individual interrogations would be conducted showed how seriously officials took the al Qaeda threat.

It started after the CIA captured top al Qaeda operative Abu Zubaydah in spring 2002 in Faisalabad, Pakistan. When his safe house was raided by Pakistani security forces along with FBI and CIA agents, Zubaydah was shot three times during the gun battle.

At a time when virtually all counterterrorist professionals viewed another attack as imminent -- and with information on al Qaeda scarce -- the detention of Zubaydah was seen as a potentially critical breakthrough.

Zubaydah was taken to the local hospital, where CIA agent John Kiriakou, who helped coordinate Zubaydah's capture, was ordered to remain at the wounded captive's side at all times. "I ripped up a sheet and tied him to the bed," Kiriakou said.

But after Zubaydah recovered from his wounds at a secret CIA prison in Thailand, he was uncooperative. "I told him I had heard he was being a jerk," Kiriakou recalled. "I said, 'These guys can make it easy on you or they can make it hard.' It was after that he became defiant."

The CIA wanted to use more aggressive -- and physical -- methods to get information. The agency briefed high-level officials in the National Security Council's Principals Committee, led by then-National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice and including then-Attorney General John Ashcroft, which then signed off on the plan, sources said. It is unclear whether anyone on the committee objected to the CIA's plans for Zubaydah.

The CIA has confirmed Zubaydah was one of three al Qaeda suspects subjected to waterboarding. After

he was waterboarded, officials say Zubaydah gave up valuable information that led to the capture of 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheik Mohammad and fellow 9/11 plotter Ramzi bin al-Shibh.

Mohammad, who is known as KSM, was also subjected to waterboarding by the CIA.

In the interview with ABC News Friday, Bush defended the waterboarding technique used against KSM.

"We had legal opinions that enabled us to do it," Bush said. "And no, I didn't have any problem at all trying to find out what Khalid Sheikh Mohammed knew."

The president said, "I think it's very important for the American people to understand who Khalid Sheikh Mohammed was. He was the person who ordered the suicide attack -- I mean, the 9/11 attacks."

At a hearing before a military tribunal at Guantanamo Bay March 10, 2007, KSM, as he is known, said he broke under the harsh interrogation. **COURT:** *Were any statements you made as the result of any of the treatment that you received during that time frame from 2003 to 2006? Did you make those statements because of the treatment you receive from these people?*

KSM: *Statement for whom??*

COURT: *To any of these interrogators. ?*

KSM: *CIA peoples. Yes. At the beginning, when they transferred me...?*

Lawyers in the Justice Department had written a classified memo, which was extensively reviewed, that gave formal legal authority to government interrogators to use the "enhanced" questioning tactics on suspected terrorist prisoners. The August 2002 memo, signed by then head of the Office of Legal Counsel Jay Bybee, was referred to as the so-called "Golden Shield" for CIA agents, who worried they would be held liable if the harsh interrogations became public.

Old hands in the intelligence community remembered vividly how past covert operations, from the Vietnam War-era "Phoenix Program" of assassinations of Viet Cong to the Iran-Contra arms sales of the 1980s were painted as the work of a "rogue agency" out of control.

But even after the "Golden Shield" was in place, briefings and meetings in the White House to discuss individual interrogations continued, sources said. Tenet, seeking to protect his agents, regularly sought confirmation from the NSC principals that specific interrogation plans were legal.

According to a former CIA official involved in the process, CIA headquarters would receive cables from operatives in the field asking for authorization for specific techniques. Agents, worried about overstepping their boundaries, would await guidance in particularly complicated cases dealing with high-value detainees, two CIA sources said.

Highly placed sources said CIA directors Tenet and later Porter Goss along with agency lawyers briefed senior advisers, including Cheney, Rice, Rumsfeld and Powell, about detainees in CIA custody overseas.

"It kept coming up. CIA wanted us to sign off on each one every time," said one high-ranking official who asked not to be identified. "They'd say, 'We've got so and so. This is the plan.'"

Sources said that at each discussion, all the Principals present approved. "These discussions weren't adding value," a source said. "Once you make a policy decision to go beyond what you used to do and conclude it's legal, [you should] just tell them to implement it."

Ashcroft was troubled by the discussions. He agreed with the general policy decision to allow aggressive tactics and had repeatedly advised that they were legal. But he argued that senior White House advisers should not be involved in the grim details of interrogations, sources said.

According to a top official, Ashcroft asked aloud after one meeting: "Why are we talking about this in the White House? History will not judge this kindly."

The Principals also approved interrogations that combined different methods, pushing the limits of international law and even the Justice Department's own legal approval in the 2002 memo, sources told ABC News.

At one meeting in the summer of 2003 -- attended by Cheney, among others -- Tenet made an elaborate presentation for approval to combine several different techniques during interrogations, instead of using one method at a time, according to a highly placed administration source.

A year later, amid the outcry over unrelated abuses of Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib, the controversial 2002 legal memo, which gave formal legal authorization for the CIA interrogation program of the top al Qaeda suspects that was leaked to the press. A new senior official in the Justice Department, Jack Goldsmith, withdrew the legal memo -- the Golden Shield -- that authorized the program.

But the CIA had captured a new al Qaeda suspect in Asia. Sources said CIA officials that summer returned to the Principals Committee for approval to continue using certain "enhanced interrogation techniques."

Rice, sources said, was decisive. Despite growing policy concerns -- shared by Powell -- that the program was harming the image of the United States abroad, sources say she did not back down, telling the CIA: "This is your baby. Go do it."

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
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Q&A: JOHN NEGROPONTE **No Hand-Wringing, Please**

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“My view [on Iraq and Afghanistan]
is that we underestimated the
security challenges. We moved into
a reconstruction phase while we
were still in a conflict situation.”

— John Negroponte



Ambassador John Negroponte has been a firsthand witness to events that shook the world and transformed the U.S. government. Just days after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, he was named U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, where he helped manage the international response. Negroponte was appointed the first U.S. ambassador to Iraq in June 2004, and beginning in April 2005 he was the first person to serve in the new position of director of national intelligence after reforms of the spy community. Negroponte currently serves as the deputy secretary of State, the department's second-ranking official. He spoke recently with *National Journal* Staff Correspondent James Kitfield. Edited excerpts follow.

Q: When foreign-affairs experts look at the global landscape, they see an unusual amount of chaos and instability -- nation building and counterinsurgency warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan, confrontation with Iran, assassination and political paralysis in Pakistan and Lebanon, violence and genocide in Africa, populist upheaval in Latin America, a rapidly rising China and increasingly belligerent Russia, and new sanctuaries for terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda. Do you agree that these are particularly challenging times?

Negroponte: Well, first of all I would say that we live in an era when a rapid and intense news cycle has the effect of magnifying events so that they seem to come at us with a vengeance, intensifying the feelings you describe. Also I would ask, an unusual period compared to what? When I was a freshman in college in the fall of 1956, for instance, we witnessed the invasion of the Suez and the Hungarian revolution at the same time. Talk about troubled times. So sometimes the world does look like a very troubled place.

On the positive side of the ledger, however, I would note that our democracy agenda is doing quite well in many places, such as Africa and Latin America. When you look around the world, economies are generally growing, and there is real prosperity out there. So by and large we are working off pretty solid fundamentals.

Q: Yet when you look at the difficulty of establishing functioning democracies in Afghanistan and Iraq, haven't we seen major challenges and setbacks precisely where the U.S. military is most heavily engaged?

Negroponte: There's no question that the major challenge is the Middle East. But even there, if you look at Iraq, you'll see a more promising perspective. Iraq is getting better. We have indications that the situation between Turkey and the Iraqi Kurds is calming somewhat. Lebanon is still stalemated, and that is a problem. On the other hand, for the first time in years the Lebanese army is acting like a national force and has even established a presence in the south, where Hezbollah traditionally dominated. And, of course, there is the administration's full-court press to try and promote the Middle East peace process. So I see some hopeful signs and am pretty upbeat generally. There are certainly issues that need our attention, but I don't see any cause for hand-wringing at this point.

Q: What do you say to experts who look at our missteps in Afghanistan and Iraq and conclude that the Bush administration vastly underestimated the challenges of establishing democracy and civil-society institutions in those countries?

Negroponte: I have some personal experience in that regard. I don't know whether or not it conforms to conventional wisdom, but my view is that we underestimated the security challenges. We moved into a reconstruction phase while we were still in a conflict situation. So it was not a question of underestimating the difficulty of establishing democracy, as much as we underestimated the extent of the insurgency. As a result, we put a lot of resources into reconstruction projects when we should have been in more of a counterinsurgency mode. I think we've

corrected that mistake.

Q: Do you think the administration erred in stressing the "global war on terror" as the central focus of U.S. foreign policy for so long, making us seem too militaristic to much of the world?

Negroponte: Well, I've got to stress that terrorism is still a serious threat. There are still people plotting against us and planning to do harm to the United States and our interests around the world. Some of them reside in the tribal areas of Pakistan and along the Pakistan-Afghan border. We have to curtail that activity. But if you're suggesting that we have to deal with the threat of terrorism in a multifaceted way and that military means alone are not sufficient, then I agree. The solution requires the military but also good intelligence. We also have to address the root causes that serve as the breeding ground for terrorism.

Q: When we as a nation are still debating the morality and efficacy of "harsh" interrogation techniques that much of the world consider torture, and indefinite detainment that lies outside the rule of international law, can the United States really win the "war of ideas" that President Bush insists is crucial to this conflict?

Negroponte: I get concerned that we're too retrospective and tend to look in the rearview mirror too often at things that happened four or even six years ago. We've taken steps to address the issue of interrogations, for instance, and waterboarding has not been used in years. It wasn't used when I was director of national intelligence, nor even for a few years before that. We've also taken significant steps to improve Guantanamo. People will tell you now that it is a world-class detention facility. But if you want to highlight and accent the negative, you can resurface these issues constantly to keep them alive. I would rather focus on what we need to do going forward.

Q: Is closing Guantanamo Bay an important part of that future agenda, as President Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice have suggested?

Negroponte: I think closing Guantanamo is a long-term goal, though I don't know when it will be possible. In the meantime, we as a nation have to address the issue of what we do with people who pose a terrorist threat and cannot just be let loose on our society. There is a very high rate of recidivism with some of these people. If we let them go and they carry out similar terrorist actions in the future, we will have only ourselves to blame.

Q: One of the signature and most controversial aspects of the Bush foreign policy has been your great reluctance to engage in negotiations with adversaries, most notably Iran. Given that we talked constantly with the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War, why refuse to engage Iran?

Negroponte: Well, there is perhaps a little more contact with some of these societies than we are given credit for. In the case of Iran, we've certainly engaged indirectly in an intense way through the E.U.-3 [the European Union's Britain, France, and Germany], the United Nations, and the International Atomic Energy Agency. It's true we haven't had direct talks, except in Iraq on issues specific to that situation. That's probably the best approach, because we have to focus on where we can best advance our interests. Our nuclear interests are best covered in the E.U.-3 dialogue. Iraq issues we have with Iran are dealt with by ambassadorial engagement in Baghdad.

Q: But given that the United States reached a deal on North Korea's nuclear weapons program only after the administration relaxed its refusal to talk on a bilateral basis, why not just sit down with Iranian leaders and negotiate directly?

Negroponte: The flip side of that approach is that unless you have an indication that Iran is really prepared to talk about its destabilizing activities in the region -- whether in Iraq, Lebanon, Afghanistan, or in terms of the Middle East peace process -- direct, high-level talks might simply encourage them. They may feel that talks give them a free pass to continue behaving badly. If they are serious about improving the atmosphere between our countries, I would hope that Iran would address some of the security issues we have raised during our ambassadorial-level talks in Baghdad. As far as Iran's nuclear program, Secretary Rice has made it very clear that if Iran suspends its uranium enrichment, that would open the way for direct, high-level contacts between us.

Q: Given polls that show a significant increase in isolationist sentiment among Americans as a result of the Iraq war, how worried are you that the public will not support global U.S. leadership in the future?


Negroponte: I do worry about that attitude among the public. We need to remind ourselves constantly that Americans make up only around 4 percent of the world's population. We have to engage with the other 96 percent of people who live outside our borders, and work with them constructively toward peace and stability. Because even though we make up only 4 percent of the world's population, we account for 25 percent of the world's economy, and we are by far the world's largest military power. Practically every country I've ever dealt with sees its

relationship with the United States as its most important bilateral relationship. Whether they are friends or adversaries, every country has to take the U.S. point of view into account. So we have to try and make the case continually to the American people that our society and economy benefit from engagement with other countries, and what we stand for and advocate really counts around the world.

Q: If you had one piece of advice for the next president, what would it be?

Negroponte: I would certainly counsel whoever the next president is to have patience with respect to Iraq. Let's not throw out the baby with the bathwater in that regard.

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